fallibilisme

Fallibilisme (often rendered in English as fallibilism) is a philosophical position that claims human knowledge, justification, and belief can be mistaken. It holds that there may always be grounds for doubt and that no claim is immune to revision in light of new evidence. While many fallibilists accept that knowledge exists, they deny that it can be obtained with absolute certainty; justification, even when strong, is inherently fallible.

Historically, fallibilisme is linked to Charles Peirce, who argued that scientific knowledge grows through fallible conjectures corrected by experience, and to William James. In the 20th century, Karl Popper advanced a robust form of fallibilism, emphasizing conjectures and falsification over verification. The doctrine has influenced debates in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and justification theory.

Key ideas include the distinction between truth and certainty, the corrigibility of beliefs, and the view that science progresses by error elimination rather than by attaining final, unassailable foundations. Fallibilism supports continuous inquiry, methodological scepticism as a tool for investigation, and the idea that robust knowledge can be attained even when beliefs remain contestable.

Critiques contend that universal fallibility risks undermining knowledge claims or normative justification. Proponents reply that fallibilism preserves epistemic realism while avoiding unwarranted certainty, and that knowledge can be durable and reliable even if all beliefs are ultimately revisable. In contemporary discourse, fallibilisme remains central in discussions about how knowledge is acquired, justified, and revised.