fallibilism

Fallibilism is the epistemological view that human knowledge, belief, or justification is never immune to error. It holds that even well-supported, rationally justified, or widely accepted beliefs may turn out to be mistaken, and that the possibility of error does not necessarily preclude knowledge. The position is often contrasted with infallibilism, which maintains that knowledge requires certainty or indefeasible justification.

The term and related ideas are commonly associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, who emphasized the provisional and revisable character of inquiry. Fallibilism appears across philosophy of science and epistemology as a commitment to tentative conclusions, continual testing, and openness to revision. It undergirds scientific methodology and is congenial to views that stress conjecture and refutation, such as Karl Popper’s falsifiability principle, though fallibilism is broader and descriptive rather than a strict method.

Variants of fallibilism differ on scope and strength: some claim all human knowledge is potentially fallible, while others allow for fallibility in many domains but not for certain logical truths or basic empirical certainties. Defenders argue that fallibilism accommodates ordinary knowledge and rational discourse without demanding absolute certainty. Critics contend it can lead to excessive skepticism or undermine trust in justified belief, though proponents reply that recognizing fallibility need not entail radical doubt and can promote more careful and robust inquiry.

Contemporary discussion addresses fallibilism’s implications for justification, testimony, scientific practice, and rational belief revision.