courtmay

Courtmay is a term used in contemporary legal theory to describe a hypothetical discretionary principle by which a court may depart from or modify ordinary procedural rules to prevent injustice. It is not an established doctrine in major legal systems but a conceptual tool used in scholarly debate to analyze when and how courts could flex procedural rules without violating rights or statutory commands.

Etymologically, courtmay blends “court” with “may,” signaling that courts possess a degree of discretionary authority to adjust procedures under exceptional circumstances. Proponents frame courtmay as residing within the spectrum of existing equity and discretion, complementing tools such as continuances, stays, late-evidence admission, or relief from default, while seeking a principled standard rather than ad hoc rulings.

In scholarly discussions, courtmay is often invoked in contexts where rigid rule application would risk grave injustice, such as complex or novel evidence, time-sensitive matters, or vulnerable litigants facing barriers to access. Proposed operational ideas suggest a threshold showing of substantial risk of injustice if rules are applied, a recognizable public interest, and a balance that would not unduly prejudice other parties. The practical effect would typically be an order granting relief, extended deadlines, or temporary accommodations, exercised only within existing constitutional and statutory boundaries.

Critics argue that courtmay could undermine predictability and invite inconsistent rulings, thereby eroding the rule of law. Advocates counter that carefully defined limits and transparent justification can preserve fairness while mitigating avoidable harms. In current practice, courts rely on established equitable powers and procedural relief rather than a codified courtmay doctrine, making it a debated theoretical construct rather than a formal legal principle.