contextualism

Contextualism is a group of theories in epistemology and philosophy of language arguing that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions depend on the context of the speaker or conversational context. The central claim is that the standard of justification used to assert knowledge varies with situation, so a sentence like “S knows that P” can be true in one context and false in another without any change in the proposition P itself.

In its epistemological form, contextualism contrasts with invariantist theories that assign fixed truth conditions to knowledge claims regardless of context. The modern development of contextualism is often associated with Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose in the 1990s, with subsequent elaboration by philosophers such as Jason Stanley and others. The position has generated extensive debate about how language and justification relate to context.

How contextualism works rests on the idea that conversational context supplies the relevant epistemic standards. In ordinary discourse, the standards for knowing might be relatively lenient, permitting knowledge ascribing with modest evidence. In a skeptical or high-stakes context, those standards tighten, and the same person might fail to meet the higher criteria, making “S knows that P” false in that context even though P is true and S’s evidence is unchanged.

Examples commonly discussed involve shifts in what counts as adequate justification. A student might say, “I know the door is closed,” in casual talk with a friend, while in a philosophical discussion about skeptical scenarios the same sentence could be judged false if one requires far stronger evidence against the possibility of error. Critics challenge whether such context-shifting captures knowledge ascriptions without producing odd or counterintuitive outcomes, and some propose invariantist or alternative semantic accounts. See also epistemology of language and skepticism.