Sidokanalsattacker

Sidokanalsattacker is a term used to describe an attacker who exploits side-channel information produced by the physical implementation of a device or system that handles sensitive data. Rather than attacking software, networks, or cryptographic algorithms directly, a sidokanalsattacker seeks leakage from the device’s operation, such as how long computations take, how much power is drawn, electromagnetic emissions, acoustic signals, or memory access patterns, all of which can correlate with secret information like cryptographic keys.

Common targets for sidokanalsattacks include cryptographic modules, smart cards, embedded devices, and other hardware running security-sensitive code. Attacks are typically categorized by the type of leakage observed and the attacker’s access: timing attacks exploit variations in execution time; power analysis attacks measure electrical power consumption (including differential power analysis); electromagnetic analysis uses EM emissions; and sometimes fault-injection or thermal/power perturbations are used to reveal secrets. Attacks can be passive, where the attacker merely observes, or active, where the attacker perturbs the system to induce information leakage.

The field emerged in the 1990s with demonstrations that practical secret keys could be recovered from physical leakage, notably timing attacks and differential power analysis. In response, researchers and practitioners developed countermeasures such as constant-time implementations, masking and noise introduction, shielding and isolation, and hardware-level protections, as well as secure design practices and verification methods to reduce leakage and improve resilience against sidokanalsattacks.

See also: side-channel attack, cryptographic hardware security, fault injection, secure coding practices.