computationalism

Computationalism is a philosophy of mind and cognitive science according to which minds operate as information-processing systems. Proponents hold that mental states are computational states that represent information and that cognition consists of rule-governed manipulation of these representations. The view is often associated with the idea that cognition can be modeled as computation over symbols, akin to a computer program, and that the same cognitive processes could be realized on different physical substrates.

Historically, computationalism has roots in the work of Turing, Newell and Simon, and in the physical symbol system hypothesis proposed by Newell and Simon. It is influenced by the Church-Turing thesis and by symbolic AI traditions, which treated cognition as computation over internal representations. Key debates include whether computation is necessary and sufficient for intelligent behavior and whether mental content is intrinsic to the symbol manipulation.

Variants distinguish strong from weak forms. Strong computationalism claims that mental processes are literally computational, while weak forms use computation as a useful abstract framework. There is also tension with connectionist and embodied approaches, which emphasize neural networks, subsymbolic processing, and interaction with the body and environment. The symbol-grounding problem and concerns about intentionality have been central criticisms.

Critics have raised arguments such as the Chinese Room thought experiment, which challenges whether symbol manipulation alone can yield understanding, and the problem of multiple realizability, which suggests that the same cognitive functions could be implemented in non-computational substrates. Proponents respond by refining the notion of computation, information, or by embracing embodied or dynamical perspectives.

Today computationalism remains influential in cognitive science and artificial intelligence as an abstract framework for modeling cognition. It coexists with alternative approaches such as connectionism and embodied cognition, and continues to inform research in cognitive architectures, programming of cognitive models, and the philosophy of mind.