RegulierungsCapture

RegulierungsCapture, commonly called regulatory capture, is the idea that regulatory agencies charged with safeguarding public interests may come to promote the interests of the industries they regulate rather than those of the public. The phenomenon arises when regulators rely on the regulated industry for information, expertise, or funding; when personnel move between industry positions and government (the revolving door); and when political incentives reward industry-favorable outcomes. Information asymmetries, lobbying, and campaign contributions can shape rules, inspections, and enforcement in ways that reduce competition, lower compliance costs for incumbents, or delay stricter standards.

Regulatory capture can lead to policy outcomes that favor incumbents at the expense of consumers and competition, and may undermine trust in public institutions. It can affect areas such as financial regulation, environmental and health standards, energy and utilities, and telecommunications, where firms attempt to influence rulemaking and enforcement to their advantage. The theory originated in regulatory economics, with George Stigler as a prominent early proponent, arguing that regulation often serves the interests of the regulated industry. Subsequent work has explored capture across sectors and political systems, highlighting both the vulnerability of agencies and the conditions that exacerbate or mitigate it.

Mitigation strategies include enhancing transparency and accountability, strengthening conflict-of-interest rules, creating independent oversight bodies, rotating personnel to limit revolving-door effects, public-interest audits, and implementing sunset clauses or performance-based regulation to reassess rules periodically. Effective safeguards aim to align regulatory outcomes with broader public welfare rather than with narrow industry interests.