privatio

Privatio is a Latin term meaning deprivation or absence. In philosophical and theological usage, it refers to the absence or negation of a property that should be present in a thing. The word derives from privare, to deprive, and appears across classical and medieval writings to describe how things can fail to possess a given quality without it being a positive thing in itself.

The best-known application is privatio boni, the idea that evil is not a substance but the privation of good. This view, associated most closely with Augustine of Hippo, argues that God created a good world and that evils arise from the loss or deficiency of good, rather than from some independent evil entity. The account aims to preserve the integrity of creation and to explain why evil seems parasitic on good.

In medieval philosophy, the privation account was developed within a hylomorphic framework. Aquinas and other scholastics maintained that beings are constituted by form and matter, and that privation explains defections from proper form or order without positing a separate active evil cause. The approach influenced debates about the nature of evil, free will, and the problem of suffering within a world governed by a good creator.

Contemporary discussions retain the term in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion, especially in debates about natural evil, moral responsibility, and the nature of wrongdoing. While some philosophers challenge privatio as a complete account of evil, it remains a influential lens for explaining absence, deficiency, and the apparent non-being of certain properties within beings.