agentcausal

Agent-causal theories of action and free will hold that some actions are caused directly by agents themselves, not merely by events in the agent’s brain. According to these views, the origin of an action lies with the agent or the agent’s will, creating a causal chain that starts with the agent rather than with prior physical states.

Historically, the theory is closely associated with the work of Roderick Chisholm, who argued that agents can be originators of actions in a way that is not reducible to preceding events. Subsequent philosophers such as Timothy O’Connor have elaborated and defended agent-causal accounts, connecting them to libertarian notions of free will and to moral responsibility that seems to require agents as ultimate sources of their actions.

Key ideas typical of agent-causal theories include the claim that agents can initiate actions in a manner that is not fully determined by prior physical states, and that the agent’s causal role helps explain responsible choice. Proponents often appeal to the agent’s reason-responsive capacities or to a sui generis form of causation that operates at the level of the agent.

Critics raise several objections. A central challenge is the causal closure of the physical: if every brain event is fully caused by prior physical events, how can an agent’s will be an independent source? Others question how non-physical or primitive agent causation would interact with the physical brain, and whether such accounts can provide testable, coherent mechanisms. Despite debate, agent-causal theories remain a prominent option in discussions of libertarian free will and moral responsibility, contrasted with event-causal and compatibilist approaches.