Pancomputationalism

Pancomputationalism is the view that computation is a fundamental aspect of reality. In its broadest form, it holds that physical processes can be described as computations; in its strongest form, every physical system implements a computation, making the universe itself a computer. In a weaker sense, computation is simply a ubiquitous and useful description of natural processes.

A central distinction within pancomputationalism concerns intrinsic versus ascriptive accounts. Intrinsic pancomputationalism claims that systems perform computations as part of their physical dynamics. Ascriptive or epistemic pancomputationalism holds that observers attribute computation to systems through modeling choices, and that computation may be a convenient description rather than an ontological feature.

Historical and theoretical context often link pancomputationalism to digital physics and to the computational view of physical law. Proponents include Seth Lloyd, author of Programming the Universe, who argues that the universe performs computation within physical limits, and Edward Fredkin, a proponent of digital physics who emphasizes information processing as foundational to physics.

Implications and criticisms focus on definitional and empirical issues. If universal computation is ontological, questions arise about what counts as a computation, how to distinguish genuine computation from simulation, and how such claims could be tested. Critics warn that pancomputationalism risks reifying computation beyond its epistemic and explanatory utility, and that intrinsic computation may be difficult or impossible to verify.

In relation to philosophy of mind, pancomputationalism intersects with computational theories of mind but is not identical to them; some theorists view computation as essential to cognition, while others treat it as a powerful descriptive tool rather than a metaphysical claim. See also digital physics, computational theory of mind, and information theory.