Inputism

Inputism is a term used to describe a family of theories in philosophy of mind and epistemology that foreground sensory input and information acquisition as the principal determinants of knowledge, perception, and belief formation. Proponents argue that the mind functions as an information-processing system that constructs its content primarily from structured data received from the external world, including sensory signals, linguistic input, social cues, and digital data streams. According to this view, cognitive content is largely shaped by the quality, variety, and organization of input, while inner reasoning plays a secondary or regulatory role.

The term has emerged in contemporary discussions rather than as a single, well-defined doctrine. Variants of Inputism overlap with empiricism, externalism, and information-theoretic approaches, while differing on the weight given to innate structures, prior expectations, or internal constraints. Some formulations emphasize active sampling and attention as mechanisms that filter and organize input, whereas others stress passive reception.

Critics contend that Inputism can understate the role of internal cognitive architecture, prior knowledge, and constructive inference. They warn that overly strong emphasis on input risks instrumentalism or neglect of how agents interpret and restructure information. Operationalizing input in empirical research also proves challenging, given the murky boundary between raw data and interpreted content.

In practice, aspects of Inputism influence discussions in cognitive science, education, interface design, and AI, where input quality and representational structure are recognized as central to learning, understanding, and behavior. See also empiricism, externalism, information theory, enactivism.