Fallibilismthat

Fallibilismthat is not a widely recognized term in philosophy. It appears to be a nonstandard or coined expression rather than a defined doctrine in standard epistemology. In a wiki-style sense, the term could be understood as a hypothetical extension or a thought experiment built from fallibilism, the view that beliefs can be mistaken and that knowledge does not require absolute certainty.

If interpreted as a distinct idea, fallibilismthat would denote a stance in which all epistemic claims—including the very claim to the validity of fallibilism itself—are regarded as fallible. In this reading, the position emphasizes perpetual revisability and self-scrutiny, insisting that even meta-epistemic commitments must be open to challenge and revision. This would push beyond ordinary fallibilism by foregrounding self-referential caution: the justification for trusting a theory of knowledge would itself be fallible and susceptible to counterexample or error.

Relationship to fallibilism: standard fallibilism holds that knowledge can be fallible and that justification may be imperfect, but still allows for robust, corrigible claims about the world. Fallibilismthat, if adopted, would sharpen the self-critical posture by treating all epistemic commitments as provisional and by highlighting potential self-undermining risks.

Implications and debates: as a thought experiment, fallibilismthat raises questions about self-reference, epistemic modesty, and the durability of justification. It can serve to illuminate the limits of justification theories and the boundaries of skepticism, without offering a settled, widely accepted doctrine.

See also: fallibilism, skepticism, epistemology, self-reference.