Antisubstantivalists

Antisubstantivalists are philosophers who contend that the material constitution of the physical world, including the stuff that makes up objects and space, is not a fixed or determinate reality. In other words, they reject the idea that there exists a concrete substance or fabric that occupies space and has a certain mass or density.

Substantivalism, in contrast, is the view that space and time are substance-like entities, akin to a physical matrix or container that contains objects and events. Antisubstantivalists, however, argue that this picture is flawed and fails to account for the nature of reality. They often point to the notion of empty space, where there is no matter or physical presence, as evidence against substantivalism.

One of the key arguments against substantivalism is the idea that it leads to an infinite regress, where we must posit an even broader or more fundamental substance that underlies the space and time we experience. This can lead to an arbitrarily nested hierarchy of substances, where there is no clear stopping point.

Some critiques of antisubstantivalism argue that it fails to provide a clear and coherent alternative to substantivalism. Others contend that the distinction between substrates and properties is not as clear-cut as antisubstantivalists maintain. However, the debate remains ongoing, with proponents of both views arguing that their position better captures the essential nature of reality. Antisubstantivalism is a perspective that continues to inform discussions in ontology, metaphysics, and philosophy of physics, offering a unique and thought-provoking alternative to the traditional views on the nature of reality.