zeroproof

Zeroproof is a term encountered in discussions of cryptographic proof systems to describe a method for proving the truth of a statement with minimal or zero leakage of information beyond the statement’s validity. The label is not universally standardized and its precise meaning can vary between sources, but it is generally used to emphasize the absence of auxiliary information that could be learned by a verifier.

In practice, zeroproof concepts are related to, and sometimes contrasted with, zero-knowledge proofs. A zeroproof aims to ensure that, besides establishing that the statement is true, the proof reveals no additional data about the prover, the witness, or the underlying computation. This broader emphasis on zero leakage can lead to different formal requirements or security definitions, and some authors treat zeroproofs as a subset or a particular interpretation of zero-knowledge proofs, while others use the term to denote a stricter leakage-free notion.

Formal properties typically discussed in zeroproof contexts include completeness (a true statement can be proven convincingly), soundness (false statements cannot be proven), and leakage considerations (the verifier does not learn information beyond the statement’s truth value). Achieving zero leakage in practical protocols often involves cryptographic primitives such as commitment schemes, randomness extraction, and careful protocol design, and it may depend on specific computational assumptions.

Applications of zeroproof ideas include privacy-preserving authentication, verifiable computation, and secure multi-party verification, where verifiers need assurance of correctness without gaining access to sensitive inputs or intermediate results. Because the term lacks a single, universally accepted definition, readers should consult the surrounding literature to understand how a given source construes zeroproof in its context.