strategiafstemning

Strategiafstemming, or strategic voting, is the practice of casting a vote for a candidate, party, or option that is not the voter’s first preference, with the aim of achieving a more favorable overall outcome. It rests on assessments of how likely different results are and how the electoral system translates votes into seats or power.

The prevalence and form of strategiafstemming depend on the voting system. In plurality or first-past-the-post systems, where only one candidate wins and many votes are effectively wasted, voters may vote strategically to prevent an undesirable candidate from winning. In two-round or runoff systems, voters may adjust their choice to influence whether a second round is needed or which coalition could form. In proportional representation systems, strategic voting can occur around electoral thresholds or party lists, though it is often less about defeating a rival in a single race and more about shaping seat distribution.

Mechanisms often cited include vote-splitting (supporting a less-preferred but viable candidate to block a more disliked one) and compromise voting (choosing a broadly acceptable option to maximize overall influence). Voters may also abstain or vote strategically to influence party thresholds or coalition outcomes.

Critics argue that strategiafstemming can distort genuine preferences, require extensive information, and lead to cynical or predictable electoral dynamics. Proponents note that it can enhance overall voter influence in systems where outcomes depend on relative rather than absolute support.

Scholarly discussions frame strategiafstemming as a rational response to the incentives created by specific electoral rules, voter information, and the expected behavior of other participants.