speciesism

Speciesism is a term used in moral philosophy to describe the attribution of different moral status to beings primarily on the basis of their species. It questions why being human should in itself justify prioritizing human interests over the interests of non-human animals when relevant capacities such as the ability to suffer, feel pleasure, or have a life of continued wellbeing are similar. The term was coined by Richard D. Ryder in the 1970s and popularized by Peter Singer in Animal Liberation (1975).

Two influential responses are utilitarian and rights-based. Peter Singer argues from a preference or utilitarian framework that the suffering and preferences of all beings should count, and that species barriers should not justify causing avoidable pain. Tom Regan contends that many animals are “subjects of a life” with inherent value and thus possess rights that should not be violated simply for human benefit. Other scholars emphasize capacities such as consciousness, memory, or autonomy.

Critics challenge the scope of moral status and question whether species membership should be overridden by other traits. Some argue moral status should be tied to rationality, moral agency, or social contract, while others contend that ecological or practical considerations require different treatment of different species. Some critics also warn against anthropomorphism or dogmatic anti-humanism.

Impact and debates continue in ethics, law, and public policy. The term underpins animal-rights and animal-welfare movements and shapes debates over farming, research, entertainment, and wildlife management. Legal recognition varies by jurisdiction, from welfare standards to debates about personhood and standing for non-human animals.