regulatoringsliggame

Regulatoringsliggame is a term used in regulatory economics and political economy to denote a theoretical game that models interactions between regulatory authorities and regulated actors. It focuses on how regulatory stringency and enforcement interact with compliance decisions to shape market outcomes and social welfare. The term is descriptive and appears in some theoretical discussions rather than as a standard model name.

In a typical formulation, players are a regulator and one or more firms. The regulator selects a level of stringency and enforcement intensity, while firms decide on investments in compliance and production given expected penalties and costs. Payoffs incorporate profits, costs of compliance, penalties, and welfare effects such as safety or environmental impact.

The model can be static or dynamic. In dynamic versions, regulation affects future investments and costs, creating intertemporal incentives. Equilibria describe stable patterns of regulation and behavior, including highly stringent, lenient, or oscillating regimes. Cross-jurisdictional interactions may lead to harmonization or competitive races depending on costs and externalities.

Applications include environmental, financial, and product-safety regulation, as well as cross-border regulatory regimes. The framework helps explain how regulation spreads, why regulators may defer to industry expertise, and how reputational and political considerations influence enforcement and standard-setting.

Critics point out simplifying assumptions about rationality, information, and enforcement capacity, and note challenges in empirical testing. Despite these limitations, regulatoringsliggame provides a concise lens for studying strategic interactions between regulators and regulated entities.