normexpressivists

Norm-expressivism is a family of metaethical theories that treats normative judgments as expressions of attitudes, commitments, or policy-guiding stances rather than statements about objective facts. According to these views, saying “stealing is wrong” is not making a claim that can be true or false in a factual sense, but expressing disapproval, a preference, or a directional commitment to a certain course of action. This contrasts with cognitivist theories that view moral judgments as truth-apt descriptions of the moral features of the world.

The approach grew out of the non-cognitivist tradition in moral philosophy, including emotivism, and was developed to account for the expressive force and practical bite of moral language. Key figures associated with norm-expressivism include Allan Gibbard, whose book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings articulates an original form of expressivism, and Simon Blackburn, who further developed the theory and later advanced quasi-realist strategies that allow expressivism to resemble realist discourse about values while remaining non-cognitive.

Core ideas emphasize that moral talk often aims to guide action, coordinate behavior, or influence attitudes. Moral disagreements are frequently seen as disputes about differing attitudes or prescriptions rather than convergences or divergences in objective facts. Some expressivists adopt a quasi-realist program, attempting to explain why moral discourse seems to have truth-conditions, justification, and objectivity, even though moral judgments are not truth-apt in the standard sense.

Critics challenge whether expressivism can account for certain cognitive aspects of moral judgment, moral progress, and the apparent objectivity of some moral claims. Proponents respond with sophisticated semantic theories and mechanisms for moral reasoning within an expressivist framework. Norm-expressivism remains a central and actively debated position in contemporary metaethics.