Normexpressivism

Norm-expressivism is a metaethical position within expressivism that holds moral judgments primarily express normative attitudes toward actions or rules, rather than state propositions with truth conditions. According to norm-expressivists, when we say “X is wrong” we are not reporting a fact about the world but expressing approval or disapproval of a norm against X and signaling a commitment to following that norm. Moral language, in this view, functions to guide behavior and coordinate norms among agents.

The term is most closely associated with Allan Gibbard, especially in his work Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990), where he develops a detailed account of how moral discourse prescribes and negotiates norms. The approach is a form of non-cognitivism or expressivism, emphasizing that moral talk expresses attitudes, commitments, and plans rather than objective states of affairs. Other expressivists have elaborated related ideas, but norm-expressivism specifically foregrounds the normative content and how it governs rational discussion and action.

Core claims include that moral sentences are not truth-apt in the traditional sense; they express commitments to particular norms, and moral disagreement reflects different normative standpoints rather than factual dispute. This view aims to explain the prescriptive force and constructive roles of moral language, including how norms can be revised in light of reasons, coherence with other commitments, or social practices.

Critics challenge whether norm-expressivism can capture moral knowledge, justification, and moral progress, or account for cross-cultural comparisons and the apparent objectivity presented in some moral disputes. Proponents respond by arguing that norm-expressivism provides a coherent account of the practical and relational dimensions of morality without requiring moral facts.

See also: expressivism, non-cognitivism, moral realism, moral psychology.