eliminativists

Eliminativists are proponents of eliminativism in the philosophy of mind, arguing that certain common-sense mental states—especially beliefs, desires, and intentions—do not exist as scientifically real entities. They contend that “folk psychology,” the everyday framework for predicting and explaining behavior, will be replaced by a more accurate neuroscience, rather than refined by additional psychological categories. In its strongest form, eliminativism claims that some mental concepts are fundamentally misdescribed and may disappear from scientific discourse altogether.

Historically, eliminativism gained prominence in the late 20th century through the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland, who argued that many folk-psychological categories are false or misleading and that only neuroscientific explanations of brain processes should be taken seriously. The position has been associated with debates in the philosophy of mind about the status of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states, and it has been discussed alongside competing approaches such as reductionism, functionalism, and naturalized epistemology. Some cognitive scientists and philosophers, like Stephen Stich, have explored eliminativist ideas or revisions to folk psychology without embracing a full elimination of all mental talk.

Critics of eliminativism contend that folk psychology remains pragmatically reliable and empirically productive for everyday explanation, social interaction, and cognitive science. They argue that while neuroscience may refine or replace some concepts, many mental-state terms retain explanatory utility. The debate continues to influence discussions on the nature of mental representation, consciousness, and the integration of philosophy with cognitive science.