antifoundationalism

Antifoundationalism is a family of philosophical positions that rejects the idea that justification for beliefs must derive from non-inferential foundations. Proponents argue there is no secure bedrock of self-evident beliefs upon which all knowledge rests. Instead, justification is understood as holist, coherent, pragmatic, defeasible, or social, and may be secured by the fit of a belief within a broader network, the reliability of cognitive processes, or the success of practices in use.

The most common strands include coherentism, which holds that a belief is justified by its coherence with other beliefs; fallibilist or pragmatic approaches, which tie warrant to practical success or usable consequences rather than absolute certainty; and reliabilist or naturalized accounts, which base justification on the reliability of belief-forming processes and cognitive faculties. Antifoundationalism often encompasses social and contextual dimensions as well, emphasizing the role of linguistic practices, norms, and institutions in shaping justification.

Historically, antifoundationalism is associated with a shift away from Cartesian or traditional foundationalism in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Willard Van Orman Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction and his image of the “web of belief” are frequently cited as influential, illustrating a move toward non-foundational accounts. In science, antifoundationalist themes appear in debates about theory-laden observation and the historical contingency of justification, as exemplified by Kuhn and related approaches.

Critics argue that antifoundationalism can lack objective normative standards and invite relativism or vagueness. Proponents reply that the antifoundationalist stance better reflects the fallible, socially embedded, and empirically oriented character of real-world knowledge.