reliabilist

Reliabilism is a family of externalist theories in epistemology about the nature of justification and knowledge. The central claim is that a true belief counts as justified, or as knowledge, when it is produced by a reliable cognitive process or mechanism that tends to generate true beliefs across a wide range of environments.

In its standard form, process reliabilism holds that the justification of a belief depends on the reliability of the process by which the belief was formed. Reliability is evaluated by the process’s track record across many cases, not by the subject’s level of awareness or internal access to the process. Because reliabilism is externalist, a person can be justified even if they do not know that their belief-forming process is reliable or understand why it is reliable.

Variants of reliabilism distinguish among different notions of reliability, such as simple process reliability, production versus generation of beliefs, and domain-specific reliability. The theory has been extended and debated in responses to classic problems like the Gettier cases, which challenge the idea that justified true belief suffices for knowledge. Some defenders add safety or tracking conditions to handle coincidences where a true belief arises from a reliable process but by luck.

Critics question whether reliability alone can secure knowledge without internal justification or concerns about anti-reliabilist intuitions. Proponents argue that reliabilism offers a straightforward account of justification aligned with cognitive science and real-world reliability. Historically associated with Fred Dretske and, more prominently, Alvin Goldman, reliabilism remains influential in contemporary epistemology.