coherentism

Coherentism is a theory in epistemology about how beliefs are justified. It holds that a belief is justified not by resting on basic beliefs or on reliable processes, but by its coherence with a larger system of beliefs. In a coherentist picture, justification is holistic: each belief’s status depends on its relation to the rest of the believer’s interconnected set of beliefs. A belief earns justification to the extent that it fits, supports, and is supported by other beliefs in the system, contributing to overall coherence.

Coherence typically involves logical consistency, mutual support among beliefs, and explanatory power. Some versions emphasize integration with background knowledge, alignment with sensory experience, and the avoidance of ad hoc commitments. Crucially, coherentism denies that there must be foundational beliefs that warrant other beliefs; instead, justification flows from the net structure of the entire belief system.

Historically, coherentism arose as an alternative to foundationalism, which posits basic beliefs that justify others. In contemporary discussion, notable defenders include Laurence BonJour and Keith Lehrer, who argue that justification is a matter of coherence within a comprehensive belief network. Various defenders also explore hybrid or pluralist forms that incorporate elements such as external factors or limited foundational concessions.

Critics of coherentism raise several issues. One common objection is that coherence alone may be compatible with false or mutually supporting but false systems, so coherence might not guarantee truth. Another is the possibility of more than one equally coherent system, making justification relative or indeterminate. Respondents often argue that coherence must be supplemented by criteria for reliability, experiential input, or intersubjective assessment to address these problems.