akrasia

Akrasia is a term from ancient Greek philosophy that describes acting against one’s better judgment. It refers to a failure of self-control in which a person recognizes what would be wise or virtuous but chooses a course that is contrary to that judgment. It is not simply ignorance.

In Aristotle’s ethics, akrasia is a weakness of will. The akratic person knows the good but is overtaken by appetites or passions, leading to a difficult conflict between reason and desire. By contrast, a virtuous person possesses practical wisdom (phronēsis) and reliably aligns actions with correct judgment. The question of whether knowledge alone suffices for virtuous action has been a persistent concern in virtue theory.

Other ancient sources offer related perspectives. The Stoics argue that akrasia arises from faulty assent to appearances and that reason can and should guide judgment, though people may still act on mistaken impulses. In various traditions, akrasia is treated as a problem of balancing desire, belief, and judgment rather than a simple lack of information.

In modern times, akrasia is discussed in psychology and behavioral economics as a form of self-control failure or present-biased decision making. Research on procrastination, temptation, and impulse control connects akrasia to systems of reasoning and emotion, with policy and personal strategies such as implementation intentions, commitment devices, and environment design aimed at reducing it.

Today the term is used across ethics, decision theory, and cognitive science to describe acts that conflict with long-term goals, while remaining distinct from clinical conditions.