actualism

Actualism is a position in the philosophy of modality and metaphysics that holds that only actual, concrete things exist. According to actualism, possible scenarios, properties, or events do not correspond to distinct, concrete worlds beyond the actual world. Instead, modal facts are analyzed using the actual world and non-world abstractions such as propositions, states of affairs, or tropes that do not themselves constitute additional worlds. Some actualists treat possible worlds as useful fictions or linguistic conveniences for reporting what could be the case, while others define modal language in terms of quantification over actual entities and their relations.

Actualism is typically contrasted with modal realism, the view associated with David Lewis, which holds that there are many concrete possible worlds as real as the actual world. It is also contrasted with possibilist approaches that grant some status to possible worlds. In actualist accounts, truth conditions for modal and counterfactual statements are explained without committing to the real existence of alternative worlds; instead, they derive from the structure of the actual world or from abstract representations tied to actual entities.

The approach raises questions about how to account for modal truth, similarity, and the intelligibility of statements about what would have happened under different conditions. Proponents argue it offers a parsimonious ontology and aligns with physicalist intuitions, while critics worry that it may struggle to capture the intuitive force of modal discourse.

See also: modal realism, possibility, counterfactuals, philosophy of language, metaphysics.