Definitionism

Definitionism is a theoretical stance in philosophy of language and semantics that holds that the content of a term is determined by explicit, carefully articulated definitions. In this view, a term's meaning is captured by its place within a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, or by stipulative definitions that assign clear criteria for applicability. Proponents argue that definitions provide stable, objective anchors for reasoning, permit precise communication, and support systematic conceptual analysis.

Origins and scope: Definitionism arose within analytic philosophy and formal semantics in the 20th century, drawing on logic, mathematics, and the study of scientific terminology. It is often contrasted with usage-based or pragmatic theories of meaning, which emphasize how terms are employed in ordinary language rather than formal definitions. Some defenders distinguish strong Definitionism, which seeks complete definitional coverage of a concept, from weaker forms that use definitions as simplifying or clarifying tools.

Central tenets: A core claim is that a term's extension (the things it applies to) is determined by the criteria stated in its definition. Definitions can be analytic (true by virtue of meanings) or synthetic (requiring further justification). Definitional analysis aims to resolve disputes by refining or replacing problematic definitions, rather than appealing to ostensive usage alone.

Examples and criticisms: Common examples include mathematical and logical terms with clear criteria, such as prime numbers or valid syllogisms; social or normative terms are more controversial due to boundary cases and cultural variation. Critics argue that many terms resist sharp definition, that overemphasis on definitions can ignore usage, context, and practical considerations, and that definitional disputes can be as intractable as empirical disagreements.

Relationship to related ideas: Definitionism intersects with conceptual analysis, formal semantics, and debates over essentialism and vagueness. It remains a debated stance within philosophy of language and logic, without universal acceptance.