panpsykism

Panpsychism is the view that mental properties are fundamental features of reality and are present in some form in all matter. Proponents argue that experience or proto-experiential properties are ubiquitous, and that mind is not something that only emerges in brains but is a basic aspect of the physical world.

Variants of panpsychism include constitutive panpsychism, which holds that physical properties are constituted by mental properties; panexperientialism, associated with thinkers such as Leibniz and Whitehead, which assigns proto-conscious experiences to elementary entities and posits that complex minds arise from the combination of these micro-experiences; and proto-experiential forms that posit primitive mental aspects at the most basic level.

Historically, ideas linking mind and matter appear in various traditions, but modern discussion has been shaped by 20th and 21st century philosophy. Contemporary proponents include Galen Strawson and Philip Goff, who defend forms of panpsychism as a way to address the hard problem of consciousness and the continuity between the mental and the physical. Some discussions also involve philosophers such as David Chalmers, who have engaged with panpsychist ideas as part of broader debates about the nature of consciousness.

Key challenges include the combination problem: how countless micro-experiences could integrate into a single, unified macro-consciousness. Critics raise concerns about empirical testability, coherence with physical theory, and the risk of positing mental properties too widely. Proponents argue that panpsychism preserves the directness of experience and treats consciousness as a fundamental aspect of nature rather than a late emergent feature.

Today panpsychism remains a minority yet increasingly influential position in philosophy of mind, prompting ongoing debate about its coherence, implications for science, and potential pathways to empirical or theoretical development.