modalistisch

Modalistisch refers to a philosophical position within the philosophy of modality. It is a view concerning the nature of possibility and necessity. A modalist typically holds that talk about possible worlds or modal concepts such as "possible" and "necessary" can be reduced to or analyzed in terms of something else, rather than being taken as fundamental.

One common form of modalism is the idea that modal properties can be understood in terms of actual properties of objects or states of affairs. For example, it might be argued that something is possible if it is consistent with the actual laws of nature and the current state of the world, or if it is logically possible in a way that can be understood without reference to unactualized worlds. This contrasts with modal realism, which posits the existence of concrete possible worlds as real as our own.

Another approach might involve analyzing modal claims in terms of subjective beliefs or attitudes. In this view, saying something is "possible" might mean that we cannot rule it out as a possibility based on our current knowledge, or that it is conceivable. This subjective interpretation distinguishes it from objective accounts of modality that aim to describe the modal structure of reality itself.

Modalism, in its various forms, seeks to provide a more parsimonious or ontologically lighter explanation of modal phenomena compared to theories that posit a robust ontology of possible worlds or treat modality as a primitive feature of reality. The debate surrounding modalism often centers on whether these reductive analyses adequately capture the nuances of modal claims and whether they can account for all the intuitions we have about possibility and necessity.