instrumentalismi

Instrumentalismi, or instrumentalism, is a philosophical position that regards scientific theories and models as tools for predicting observations and guiding action rather than as literal depictions of an objective reality. According to instrumentalism, the value of a theory lies in its usefulness and predictive success, not in claims about unobservables or the true structure of the world. Theories are judged by their capacity to organize experience and facilitate practical outcomes.

In the philosophy of science, instrumentalism is often contrasted with scientific realism. Realists hold that successful theories aim to truthfully describe underlying mechanisms, while instrumentalists emphasize function and prediction. The approach is associated with pragmatic and anti-realist currents, particularly the pragmatist tradition. Notable figures linked to instrumentalist strands include Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, who stressed the importance of practical consequences in the meaning of concepts. Ernst Mach and Pierre Duhem are also cited for influential instrumentalist tendencies in late 19th and early 20th-century science.

Variants of instrumentalism appear across disciplines. In science, it may be framed as empirical or pragmatic instrumentalism, focusing on instrumental adequacy rather than ontological commitments. In other domains, instrumentalism can describe the view that ideas, policies, or theories are valuable primarily for their instrumental use in achieving goals, rather than for claiming intrinsic truth.

Critics argue that instrumentalism risks relativism and underestimates the explanatory power of theories with successful predictive and explanatory success. Proponents counter that it remains a defensible stance about the aims and interpretation of scientific theories, especially in contexts where direct access to underlying reality is limited or contested.