inkompatibilisteja

Inkompatibilisteja refers to individuals who hold an incompatibilist view on the issue of free will and determinism. Incompatibilism is a philosophical stance that asserts free will and determinism are mutually exclusive; that is, if determinism is true, then free will cannot exist, and if free will exists, then determinism must be false.

There are two main camps within incompatibilism: hard determinists and libertarians. Hard determinists accept determinism as true and therefore deny the existence of free will. They believe that all events, including human actions, are causally necessitated by preceding events and the laws of nature. Libertarians, on the other hand, accept the existence of free will and therefore deny that determinism is true. They posit that at least some human actions are not causally determined and that individuals have genuine alternative possibilities open to them when making choices.

The debate between incompatibilists and their opponents, compatibilists, is a central topic in contemporary philosophy of action and metaphysics. Compatibilists argue that free will and determinism can coexist, often by defining free will in terms of acting according to one's desires or intentions, even if those desires and intentions are themselves determined. Inkompatibilisteja critically examine these compatibilist definitions, often arguing that they fail to capture the intuitive sense of freedom that requires genuine alternative possibilities and ultimate origination of one's actions. The arguments presented by inkompatibilisteja often involve thought experiments and analyses of moral responsibility, causation, and the nature of agency.