howness

Howness refers to a theoretical concept within certain philosophical discussions, particularly those exploring the nature of consciousness and subjective experience. It is a term used to describe the qualitative or phenomenal aspect of consciousness, often contrasted with the "whatness" of an experience. The "whatness" might be considered the factual content or the functional role of a mental state, while the "howness" is what it feels like to be in that state. For example, the "whatness" of seeing the color red could be the specific wavelengths of light detected by the retina and processed by the brain. The "howness," however, is the subjective, ineffable experience of redness itself – the feeling of red.

This concept is closely tied to the philosophical problem of consciousness, often discussed in relation to Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness." Proponents of the distinction argue that scientific explanations of brain processes can account for the "whatness" of consciousness, explaining how information is processed and behavior is generated. However, they contend that these explanations may not fully capture or explain the subjective, qualitative character of experience – the "howness." Critics, on the other hand, sometimes argue that "howness" is an ill-defined concept or that it is ultimately reducible to physical processes, even if current scientific understanding is incomplete. The debate surrounding howness continues to be a significant area of inquiry in philosophy of mind.