Selfascriptions

Selfascriptions are statements in which a person attributes properties, states, or identities to themselves, typically using first-person references such as “I.” They cover a wide range of content, from physical descriptions (“I have brown hair”) to mental states (“I feel anxious”) and personal identities (“I am a student”) or planned actions (“I will go to the store”). The essential feature is that the speaker is describing something about their own person or mind.

Selfascriptions are central to discussions of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language because they often involve direct, first-person access. Some selfascriptions seem to be known with special immediacy or authority—claims about one’s own mental state or existence, for example—while others may be open to doubt or misrepresentation. In ordinary use, selfascriptions are reliable guides to one’s own condition, but they can be mistaken or manipulated, just like any other belief.

A key topic in philosophy is how selfascriptions relate to knowledge and truth. The first-person perspective provides information that may not be accessible from the outside, leading to questions about the limits of third-person evidence. Philosophers also emphasize the role of indexicals—words like here, now, and I—in making certain selfascriptions possible or necessary. Some statements about oneself depend on perspective in a way that cannot be fully captured by external observation alone.

In psychology and cognitive science, selfascriptions appear in self-report measures, introspective reports, and accounts of identity and agency. They may reflect genuine states, intentions, or beliefs, but can also be shaped by social context, memory, or motivational factors. The study of selfascriptions thus spans linguistics, mind, and behavior, illustrating how speakers connect language, self-knowledge, and action.