Regulacích

Regulacích, also known as regulatory capture, is a phenomenon where regulatory agencies become dominated by the industries they are supposed to oversee. This can lead to policies that favor the interests of the industries that control the agency, rather than the public interest. Regulatory capture can occur through various mechanisms, including the influence of industry lobbyists, the appointment of industry representatives to regulatory positions, and the use of regulatory flexibility to benefit industry interests.

The concept of regulatory capture was first introduced by political scientist Robert B. Reich in 1989. Reich argued that regulatory agencies often become captured by the industries they regulate, leading to policies that are less effective and more costly than they would be if the agencies were independent. This can result in a variety of negative outcomes, including higher prices for consumers, reduced innovation, and environmental degradation.

To mitigate the risks of regulatory capture, various reforms have been proposed, including the appointment of independent commissioners to regulatory agencies, the use of public interest advocates within agencies, and the implementation of strict lobbying disclosure requirements. However, the effectiveness of these reforms is a subject of ongoing debate, as regulatory capture can be a complex and multifaceted issue.