Intentionthat

Intentionthat is a term used in philosophy of mind and action theory to describe a kind of commitment that targets a future state described by a proposition, rather than a concrete action. An agent with an intentionthat P expresses a sustained commitment that P will be the case, typically accompanied by motivational force, deliberative endorsement, and a readiness to act if circumstances align. This contrasts with an intentionto A, which directs the agent toward performing a specific future action A.

In practice, intentionthat P is said to govern the agent’s expectations and guidance for behavior even when no explicit plan to execute a particular sequence of steps is specified. For example, one might hold the intentionthat the project succeeds by year’s end, which can influence resource allocation, persistence, and responses to obstacles without prescribing a particular method of completion.

Origins and usage of the term are found in contemporary debates in action theory and philosophy of mind, where scholars explore how agents commit to outcomes, how such commitments interact with belief, desire, and plan formation, and how they bear on responsibility and rationality. Some critics argue that intentionthat is underspecified and overlaps with related notions such as commitment, optimism, or desiderative attitudes, raising questions about its empirical and normative distinctiveness.

Applications of the concept appear in discussions of agent modeling in artificial intelligence, ethical evaluation of long-term projects, and literary or legal analyses of commitments to future states. Overall, intentionthat contributes to nuanced accounts of how agents regulate behavior toward desired futures beyond explicit action plans.