Intentionality

Intentionality is the feature of mental states by which they are directed at, about, or with respect to objects, properties, or states of affairs. It is often described as the aboutness or directedness of thoughts, beliefs, desires, perceptions, and other mental acts. The content of intentional states can be directed toward existing things, non-existent entities, or possible futures, and it can be true or false, accurate or erroneous.

The term was popularized in the late 19th century by the philosopher Franz Brentano, who argued that intentionality is the defining mark of the mental, distinguishing mental phenomena from physical ones. Brentano’s idea was developed further by his students, notably Edmund Husserl, whose phenomenology analyzes how consciousness intentionality is constituted through acts (noesis) and their objects (noema). Husserl’s approach treats the object as it is intended in experience, rather than as it is independently given.

Theories of intentionality vary. Representational or cognitive theories treat mental states as bearers of content that are determined by internal representations. Externalist approaches hold that content depends on factors in the surrounding environment, such as relational or causal connections to the world. Debate continues over whether intentionality is an intrinsic feature of mind or something that depends on external factors, and whether non-human systems or artificial intelligence can possess genuine intentionality. In phenomenology, the distinction between noesis and noema remains a central way to describe how acts of consciousness relate to their intended objects.