Expressivists

Expressivists are a family of non-cognitivist theories in metaethics that contend moral judgments do not express beliefs about how the world is. Rather, they express attitudes—such as approval or disapproval—and function to guide action and coordinate social interaction.

In contrast to cognitivist theories, expressivists deny that moral sentences aim to describe states of the world or to be true or false; they are used to express stance, influence others, and prescribe responses.

A leading variant is Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism, which holds that moral judgments express commitments and plans that guide behavior and align with social norms. Disagreement often reflects different commitments, not mistaken beliefs.

Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism represents another development: while maintaining non-cognitivist roots, it seeks to explain why moral discourse seems to have objective force and truth-conditional aspects, without positing moral properties.

Other approaches explore how expressivism accounts for the persuasive force, the binding nature of moral discourse, and the social dimension of reasons for action, sometimes extending to aesthetics and other normative domains.

Expressivism faces criticisms, including questions about moral progress, how to model cross-cultural disagreement, and whether the view can account for apparent truth-conditions in moral discourse.

Notable figures include Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn; expressivism remains a central alternative to moral realism and emotivism in contemporary metaethics.