Expressivism

Expressivism is a family of non-cognitivist theories in metaethics that treats moral judgments as expressions of attitudes, commitments, or prescriptions rather than as propositions capable of being true or false. According to expressivists, moral language functions to express approval or disapproval, to command or encourage certain actions, or to express emotional attitudes, rather than to report objective states of the world.

Historically, expressivism evolved from emotivism, most clearly associated with the views of A. J. Ayer and, in a more developed form, C. L. Stevenson, who argued that moral sentences express non-cognitive attitudes and aim to influence others. A close contemporary variant is prescriptivism, exemplified by R. M. Hare, which holds that moral judgments function as universalizable commands or prescriptions rather than truth-apt facts. A central development in the late 20th century is norm-expressivism, associated with Allan Gibbard, which holds that moral discourse expresses plans, commitments, or norms and is guided by aims to coordinate behavior and response patterns within a community.

In modern philosophy, expressivism is often contrasted with cognitivist or realist theories that treat moral claims as capable of being true or false. Proponents seek to explain features of moral language—such as disagreement, praise, blame, and motivational force—without appealing to moral facts. Some philosophers, like later work influenced by quasi-realism, attempt to preserve ordinary moral discourse while resisting realist commitments. Critics challenge expressivism on grounds that it struggles to account for moral objectivity, moral progress, and the apparent truth-conditions of moral discourse; defenders respond by refining the account of expressive content and its role in guiding action and justification.