Compatibilismi

Compatibilismi (often called compatibilism in English) is a position in the philosophy of free will that holds that free will and determinism are mutually compatible. According to this view, human agents can be morally responsible for their actions even if those actions are determined by prior causes. Compatibilists typically reject the idea that indeterminism is required for moral responsibility, and instead revise or clarify what is meant by "free will."

Historical proponents include Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, who argued that freedom consists in acting according to one’s desires without external constraints. Modern compatibilism has been developed further by philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, who introduced second-order desires and the concept of wholeheartedness, and Daniel Dennett and John Martin Fischer, who emphasize capacities for reasons-responsiveness and guidance control. Fischer’s semi-compatibilism separates the question of moral responsibility from the truth of determinism, focusing on moral agency even if determinism holds.

Key themes in compatibilist accounts are the absence of coercion, the alignment of actions with an agent’s intentions and values, and the presence of appropriate deliberative capacities. Critics argue that compatibilism fails to secure true “sourcehood” or ultimate responsibility, or that it merely redefines freedom without addressing deeper metaphysical concerns. Compatibilism remains influential in debates about ethics, law, and responsibility, shaping discussions about punishment, praise, and personal agency.