Coherentists

Coherentists are philosophers who defend coherentism as the correct account of epistemic justification. In contrast to foundationalist theories, coherentists hold that a belief is justified not by any basic, self-evident foundation but by its relation to other beliefs within a system. A belief is justified to the extent that it coheres with the rest of the person’s beliefs, experiences, and background information. Coherence is assessed by factors such as logical consistency, explanatory power, and mutual support among propositions.

Some coherentists emphasize internalist coherence—how well the beliefs fit together for the thinker—while others allow a measure of external coherence with the world or with the beliefs of others. The approach tends to be holistic: justification depends on the entire network of beliefs rather than on a single foundational rung.

Historically, the coherentist line can be traced to 19th‑century British idealism and was developed in the analytic tradition. Early figures such as F. H. Bradley argued for the primacy of coherent relations among beliefs, and in contemporary epistemology coherentism has been defended by Laurence BonJour, among others, who argues that knowledge rests on a coherent system rather than on a few foundational intuitions.

Variants of coherentism include questions about how to measure coherence, whether coherence alone suffices for justification, and how empirical experience constrains a belief system. Critics raise concerns about the possibility of several mutually coherent yet false belief systems (the underdetermination problem), the risk of circular or ad hoc justification, and whether coherence alone guarantees truth.

Coherentism stands as one of the main rival theories of justification alongside foundationalism and infinitism, and it remains a central topic in epistemology.