Antirealismi

Antirealismi, or anti-realism, is a family of philosophical positions that question the existence of mind-independent facts or the ability of our theories to disclose such facts. It encompasses various strands that challenge realism across ontology, epistemology, semantics, science, and ethics. Proponents typically argue that what counts as true or real depends on concepts, linguistic practices, or empirical success within a given framework, rather than on an objective reality independent of our thinking.

Key variants include:

- Metaphysical or ontological anti-realism, which denies a fixed mind-independent structure of reality and treats objects, properties, or kinds as dependent on human practices, theories, or interpretations.

- Epistemic anti-realism, which questions whether we can achieve knowledge of an external world as it is, emphasizing limits, context-dependence, or framework-relative justification.

- Semantic anti-realism, which holds that truth conditions are not simply correspondence with reality but are relative to language, theory, or social practices.

- Scientific anti-realism, most prominently constructive empiricism, which maintains that science aims for empirical adequacy rather than truth about unobservable entities.

- Moral anti-realism, which contends that there are no objective moral facts and that moral discourse expresses attitudes, prescriptions, or non-cognitive stances rather than states of affairs.

Antirealism is often contrasted with scientific, moral, or metaphysical realism. It has shaped debates about the nature of truth, the interpretation of scientific theories, and the scope of human knowledge, while critics argue that it undercuts objectivity and scientific progress. Supporters respond that realism can misrepresent how we actually engage with the world and that anti-realism highlights the essential role of language, culture, and epistemic conditions.