skeptitsism

Skeptitsism is a term used in some contemporary philosophical discussions to describe a form of skepticism that integrates methodological doubt with a pragmatic standard of justification. Proponents present it as treating doubt as a tool for improving belief quality rather than as an end in itself, and as endorsing beliefs only when they survive robust, context-dependent scrutiny.

The coinage of the term is informal and scattered across online writings and small-circulation papers rather than tied to a single school. It is often portrayed as a middle path between global skepticism and naive credulity, emphasizing provisional acceptance contingent on available evidence.

Core principles include fallibilist humility, evidential sufficiency as a practical standard, and a sensitivity to cognitive biases. Skeptitsism also stresses calibrating doubt to the reliability of a domain and the consequences of belief, avoiding both overgeneral doubt and reckless certainty.

In practice it overlaps with scientific skepticism and epistemic pragmatism but differs in its emphasis on decision-making under uncertainty and on maintaining actionable beliefs while remaining open to revision.

Critics argue that the term is ill-defined and susceptible to equivocation, potentially blending skepticism with indecision. Supporters counter that it offers a workable framework for everyday epistemic judgment by balancing caution with epistemic progress.