pramana

Pramana is a central term in Indian philosophy referring to a valid source or means of knowledge. Derived from Sanskrit, the word conveys the idea of a reliable instrument by which cognition is produced and justified. In classical thought, pramana delineates how we legitimately come to know things about the external world, ourselves, and ultimate reality.

The most widely discussed pramanas are perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and testimony or authoritative word (sabda). Many schools also accept upamāna (analogy or comparison) as a pramana, while others include arthapatti (presumption or postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-perception or negative knowledge) as additional valid means. The Nyaya school, in particular, is associated with a sixfold list: pratyakṣa, anumāna, sabda, upamāna, arthapatti, and anupalabdhi. Other traditions, such as Advaita Vedanta and Mimamsa, often emphasize pratyakṣa, anumāna, and sabda, sometimes with upamāna as well.

Each pramana has its own sources of reliability and criteria for justification. Pratyakṣa relies on direct sensory experience; anumāna rests on rational inference from observed similarities or causal connections; sabda depends on the authority of a trusted source, such as scripture or a teacher. Upamāna uses analogy to transfer knowledge from a known object to an unknown one. Arthapatti infers a fact from its effects through presumption, and anupalabdhi identifies knowledge from the absence of perception.

Pramana play a key role in debates across Indian philosophical systems, serving to evaluate competing theories, clarify epistemic claims, and ground philosophical and ethical discussions in a framework of justified knowledge.