nonfüüsikalism

Nonfüüsikalism is a philosophical stance that asserts that certain aspects of reality, particularly mental phenomena, cannot be adequately explained or reduced to purely physical processes. This contrasts with physicalism, also known as materialism, which holds that everything that exists is ultimately physical or can be explained in terms of physical entities and laws.

Proponents of nonfüüsikalism often point to subjective experiences, such as the feeling of pain, the experience of color, or consciousness itself, as evidence for their position. They argue that these qualia, or the qualitative aspects of experience, seem to resist a complete physical explanation. Simply describing the neural correlates of a sensation, for example, does not seem to fully capture what it is *like* to have that sensation.

Different forms of nonfüüsikalism exist. Dualism, a prominent form, proposes that mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of substances or properties. Property dualism, for instance, suggests that while there may only be one kind of substance (physical), there are distinct, non-physical properties that emerge from complex physical systems. Other nonfüüsikalist views might posit emergent properties that, while dependent on the physical, are not reducible to it in principle. The debate often centers on the explanatory gap between the objective, third-person descriptions of physical processes and the subjective, first-person experience of consciousness.