moralantirealister

Moral anti-realism is a broad philosophical position that denies the existence of objective moral truths or facts. Unlike moral realists, who believe that moral statements refer to something real and independently existing, moral anti-realists hold that moral claims are not factual in the same way that scientific claims are. There are several distinct forms of moral anti-realism.

One prominent form is non-cognitivism, which argues that moral statements do not express beliefs or propositions that can be true or false. Instead, they are seen as expressions of emotion, attitudes, or commands. Emotivism, for instance, suggests that moral judgments are merely expressions of the speaker's feelings, akin to exclamations like "Boo!" or "Hooray!". Prescriptivism, another non-cognitivist view, proposes that moral statements function as universalizable commands or prescriptions, telling us what we ought to do.

Another significant anti-realist stance is error theory. Error theorists, such as J.L. Mackie, agree with moral realists that moral statements are indeed attempts to make factual claims about the world. However, they argue that all such claims are systematically false because there are no objective moral properties or entities in the world for them to refer to. Therefore, according to error theory, when we make moral claims, we are always mistaken.

A related position is moral subjectivism, which holds that moral truths are relative to individuals or cultures. What is considered morally right or wrong is determined by personal feelings or societal conventions, rather than by any objective standard. This contrasts with moral realism's assertion of universal moral truths.