experiencesknown

experiencesknown is a term occasionally used in philosophy of mind and epistemology to denote the subset of an agent's experiential states that are known, or that can be reliably reported as having occurred. The term is not standardized, and its exact boundaries vary by author. In general, experiencesknown aims to distinguish what a subject can point to as having been experienced from the total stream of subjective experience that may include unretrieved or unverifiable states.

In epistemology, experiencesknown is discussed in relation to self-knowledge, memory reliability, and introspective access. It is used to analyze how experiential content supports justified belief and how memory and perception contribute to knowledge claims grounded in first-hand experience. The concept is often invoked when examining the reliability of reports about what one has experienced and how such reports factor into epistemic justification.

The notion can be treated as dynamic, with the set of experiencesknown potentially expanding or contracting as memory is updated, errors are detected, or new evidence clarifies past reports. Some discussions contrast experiencesknown with the idea of experiencesunknown or potential experiences that are not presently accessible for reporting, highlighting limits of introspection and perceptual veridicality.

Critics argue that the concept risks circularity and depends on the reliability of self-knowledge and memory, which can be compromised by false memories, illusions, or dream states. As such, experiencesknown is often used as a theoretical tool rather than a precise empirical category. Related topics include knowledge, memory, epistemology, introspection, and qualia.