attributivism

Attributivism is a term used in philosophy of language and metaphysics to describe a family of positions about predication and the status of properties. The central idea is that to ascribe a property to an object is to attribute that property to the object, rather than to posit that the property exists independently of our talk. In this sense, predicates function as linguistic or conceptual attributions rather than as references to standalone properties.

As a view, attributivism can be compatible with different ontologies of properties. It emphasizes the role of attribution in meaning, truth-conditions, and reference, and it often contrasts with substantivist or realist accounts that treat properties as independent entities. The emphasis on attribution highlights how context, usage, and linguistic practice shape what is said when we deploy predicates.

In practice, attributivism is discussed in relation to how we understand ordinary statements about objects and agents. For example, in ethics, some attributive readings of moral terms treat moral properties as features we attribute to agents or actions, rather than as intrinsic features that items simply possess. In philosophy of language, attributivist analyses address how predicates function across different contexts and how truth is determined when we attribute properties.

Critics of attributivism argue that it can struggle to explain how stable, cross-context properties are identified and how truth conditions are preserved when attribution varies with interpretation. Proponents respond that attributivism clarifies the linguistic and conceptual work performed by predication and can accommodate variation across contexts without committing to controversial ontologies.

See also: predication, attribution (in philosophy), philosophy of language, ontology of properties.