antisomatosionalism

Antisomatosionalism is a philosophical position that rejects the notion that mental states are reducible to or constituted by somatosensory (bodily) states. It stands in contrast to theories that propose a strong connection, or even identity, between mental phenomena and physical sensations, proprioception, or interoception. Proponents of antisomatosionalism argue that while bodily states may be correlated with or causally influence mental experiences, they do not fully encompass or explain them.

The core argument often centers on the subjective quality of experience, or qualia. Antisomatosionalists contend that even a complete understanding of the neural and physiological processes associated with a sensation, such as the feeling of warmth, does not fully capture what it is *like* to feel warm. They suggest that mental states possess an irreducible phenomenal character that transcends purely physical descriptions of bodily states.

This view can be seen as a defense of some form of dualism or property dualism, where mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even if they arise from or interact with physical systems like the body. Alternatively, it might be held by those who believe in a non-reductive physicalism, where mental states are physical but not reducible to specific bodily states. The debate within antisomatosionalism often involves exploring thought experiments and the nature of consciousness to distinguish between the physical substrate of experience and the experience itself.