Varueksistentsus

Varueksistentsus is a term used in value theory to describe a stance that evaluative properties—such as goodness, value, or worth—are real features of the world with ontological status independent of human minds, language, or cultural practices. The notion aims to locate values as objective aspects of objects, events, or states of affairs rather than as mere expressions of attitudes or social conventions.

In this view, value properties are said to exist in virtue of the world’s structure and relations, rather than being created by consensus or merely projected from us. Proponents typically separate the existence of a value property from its normative standing or endorsement; a property can exist without everyone agreeing that it is good or valuable, and disagreement does not automatically negate its existence.

Varueksistentsus is discussed within broader debates on moral realism, axiology, and aesthetics, and it intersects with discussions about intrinsic versus instrumental value. Some formulations emphasize that evaluative properties supervene on non-evaluative facts, while others allow for a layered account in which certain values depend on context or interpretation yet retain a robust ontological footing.

The term appears as a neologism in contemporary discussions and is not yet standardized across philosophical communities. Critics question how one can meaningfully claim that evaluative properties exist, how such existence would be knowable, and what explanatory work this account provides beyond familiar realist or constructivist positions.

Applications of varueksistentsus are discussed in metaethics, philosophy of value, and theoretical economics, particularly in attempts to ground welfare, utility, or worth in objective features of the world rather than solely in subjective judgment.

See also: moral realism, axiology, value theory, intrinsic value, instrumental value.