Physicalists

Physicalists are philosophers who hold that everything that exists is physical, or that all truths about the world are ultimately grounded in physical facts. In the philosophy of mind, physicalism contends that mental states—such as beliefs, desires, and pains—are either identical to brain states or dependent on physical processes.

There are several formulations. Reductive physicalism holds that mental states are identical to specific physical states in the brain. Non-reductive physicalism acknowledges mental properties as real and causally efficacious while maintaining that they supervene on physical states. Eliminativism, sometimes grouped with physicalist positions, argues that common-sense notions of mind do not have a straightforward correspondence with brain states.

Key commitments of physicalism include the primacy of science, the supervenience of mental properties on physical properties, and the view that explanatory success in neuroscience should ultimately account for mental phenomena. Critics argue that physicalism struggles to explain consciousness, qualia, intentionality, and subjective experience, sometimes invoking the “hard problem” of consciousness. Some propose alternative frameworks such as dualism, idealism, or panpsychism.

Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, figures such as J. J. C. Smart and U. T. Place defended identity theory; Paul and Patricia Churchland promoted non-reductive or eliminative strands; David Papineau and others defended non-reductive physicalism; Daniel Dennett contributed to functionalist and materialist perspectives. Debates continue over whether mental phenomena can be fully captured by physical explanations and what counts as a sufficient form of physicalism.