Nonphysicalist

Nonphysicalist is a term used in philosophy to describe positions that reject physicalism about certain domains, most notably the mind. In philosophy of mind, nonphysicalists maintain that some aspects of mental life—such as conscious experience or mental properties—are nonphysical and cannot be fully reduced to physical processes. This stance contrasts with physicalism, which holds that all mental phenomena are physical or depend on physical states.

Two broad strands are commonly distinguished. Substance nonphysicalism, or dualism, holds that minds or mental substances are nonphysical and distinct from the physical body. Classic Cartesian dualism is the best-known example. Property nonphysicalism, or nonreductive property theory, maintains that, even if bodies are physical, mental states instantiate nonphysical properties that are not reducible to physical properties, though they may supervene on physical bases.

Nonphysicalist theories face challenges, notably the interaction problem: if mental and physical realms interact, by what mechanism can nonphysical mental states influence physical states? Proponents offer various responses, while critics appeal to explanatory economy and alignment with empirical science. The rise of comprehensive physicalist explanations has pressured some nonphysicalist accounts to explain how nonphysical properties relate to the brain and behavior.

Historically, nonphysicalist accounts emerged as alternatives to early mechanistic models of the mind, with Descartes providing a canonical form of substance dualism. In contemporary philosophy, nonphysicalist or dualist positions are discussed alongside debates over nonreductive physicalism and emergentism, with some philosophers arguing for a fundamental or irreducible character of consciousness. See also mind-body problem; dualism; property dualism; physicalism.